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Ancient Eastern thought posited the ontological integration of the “mind-body world”.
The body-mind syncretism was a foundational precept in Eastern philosophy in which
“Gih” (“Qi”) was considered the basic entity of the universe and the human being.
This study attempts to build a meta-theory and to demonstrate empirical designs
for Gih, discussing the problems of the mind and body, or the subject and object,
compared with the concept of “affordance” proposed by ecological approaches. The
notion of Gih extends beyond that of affordance in that Gih activates a psychosomatic
process between the physical condition and the mental state that facilitates the
bi-directional interactions between subject and object. Therefore, the concept of Gih
integrates mind and body, providing a means of comparing Eastern and Western
philosophical systems.
Keywords: Gih (Qi), affordance, mind–body problem, eastern philosophy, ecological psychology, perception and
action, embodied cognition
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “affordance” proposed by James J. Gibson (1904–1979) pioneered the field of
ecological psychology, defying the conceptual limitations of indirect realism reliant on constructive
processes of representations or ideas in perceptual processes (Gibson, 1968, 1979). Ecological
psychologists after Gibson (e.g., Turvey and Shaw, 1979, 1995; Shaw and Turvey, 1981; Turvey,
1992) further revised the concept of affordance (also see Turvey and Carello, 2012, for further
discussions). They suggested that affordance underlies the coordination of perception and action.
While raising some controversial issues, Lee et al. (2012) conducted experiments that demonstrated
that perceptual scales can be varied to hit-ableness. For example, a shooter can perceive a target
as enlarged when he or she hits it (a similar result is reported in Soccer by Jin and Lee, 2013).
How can this result occur? This question is commonly subsumed under the philosophical issue
of the “natural kind or proper observable” (Millikan, 1999; Ellis, 2001), for which perception
serves as empirical evidence. Focusing on embodied cognition (e.g., Glenberg, 2010; Davis and
Markman, 2012; Glenberg et al., 2013), studies integrating the perspective of subject–object can
promote the concept of affordance. A comparable paradigm from Eastern philosophy explains the
relationship between action adjustment and object estimation in a way that might be independent
of the physical action that makes affordances available.
This study proposes to use the concept of “Gih (Qi)”1 in place of “affordance”. Gih, as
conceptualized in Eastern philosophy, coordinates perception and action (see Lee et al., 2007;
Jin et al., 2015; Lee and Shaw, unpublished, for further discussions). For example, Gih can be
manifested in practicing a martial art, such as sword matching. In this case, an artist activates
Gih, matching his or her opponent to react to attacks and defenses that are concretized where and
1The term is spelled “ ” and pronounced “Gih” in Korean. It is written “ ” and is pronounced “Qi” in Chinese. In this
article, the term Gih corresponds to Qi.
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when he or she catches the other opponent’s break. The artists
are subject to a potential activation, such as Gih, which is
attuned to the situation in which the perception-action occurs.
This paper introduces and refines the concept of Gih to
elaborate how perception is coordinated with action within
this conceptual framework compared with that of affordance.
The terms “Gih” and “affordance” were originally defined as
follows:
Gih is formed ( ) through action for change ( ) to
make heaven ( refers to nature or object) and human (
refers to organism or subject) coordinated (— ). (Choi, 1857:
— ).
Affordance transcends the dichotomy of subjective-objective and
helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is both physical and
psychical yet neither physical nor psychical (Gibson, 1979).
METAPHYSICAL REVIEW
What is real resides in neither only the mind nor only the material
(i.e., the body or matter), but in the relation between the two.
The metaphysics of the mind and body have been controversial
in philosophy since Rene Descartes (1596–1650) proposed the
notion of “dualism”. Philosophical discussions on the limitations
of the dichotomy (for a review, see Kim, 1996; Ravenscroft, 2005)
have been revised to include “parallelism”, which was examined
by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), thereafter regressing
into two types of “monism”, namely “materialism”, which
was advocated by David Hume (1711–1776), and “idealism”,
which was advanced by George Berkley (1685–1783). The
metaphysics to integrate these paradigms constituted “the third
paradigm”, proposed by Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) and
Gottfried von Leibnitz (1646–1716) in the era of rationalism
and subsequently renewed by existentialists such as Edmund
Husserl (1858–1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) as well
as analytic philosophers of language, guided by Peter Frederick
Strawson (1919–2006). So-called third paradigms share the
premise that the mind and body form two aspects of experience
that originate from one entity, the third entity.
Given the above trajectory of philosophical thought, meta-
physics engages with the problems of perception between a
subject and an object. Theories of perception have been divided
into empiricist and idealist. Empiricists assert that perceptual
processes are guided by representations, which have been
incorporated into experience. Idealists counter this assertion by
arguing that perception is organized by a priori category in the
mind that does not refer to experience. The third paradigm
proposes to resolve the controversy between empiricists and
idealists. For example, ecological approaches developed the
concept of affordance, embracing certain concepts discussed
in quantum theory to characterize the interaction between
psychology and quantum mechanics either theoretically or
empirically (Turvey, 2012; Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw, 2015).
Similarly, to Western philosophy, Eastern philosophy has
discussed the problems between the person and the environment.
Here, the person is the subject, and the environment is the object.
The subject corresponds to the mind, and the object corresponds
to the material. Thus, Eastern thought, which follows two main
tracks, Taoism and Confucianism, has been concerned with the
problem of how people can live as person–like in the environment
(Pyung, 1934/1999; Feng, 2009; Tang, 2009; also see Yang, 1993,
for further discussions). It is agreed that the environment exhibits
natural laws and fates to which people accordingly try to adapt.
Furthermore, Eastern philosophy is based on a third paradigm.
Confucianism postulates two basic third entities, Gih and Lih
(for a review, see Huh, 2004). Hwoang Lee (1501–1570) proposed
that “Gih activated to implement Lih”. This statement implies
that Gih is a force or a potential that motivates an event,
and Lih is a reason or a purpose to be directed. Daeseung
Gi (1527–1572) revised this understanding of the two entities,
writing: “Gih is manipulated, and Lih is inferred”. Philosophers
thus differentiate between the two basic entities of Gih and
Lih.
Expressed in more scientific terminology, compared with
the classic discussions, Hangi Choi (1803–1877) renewed a
theory of Gih through the discipline of Gih (“Gihology”), which
derives from Confucianism and Taoism but is also influenced
by the Western disciplines, such as the electromagnetic theory
of Newtonian physics (Choi, 1857). First, as the quotation at
the end of the Introduction states, Gih is defined as “action for
change (potential activated)”. Second, Gih is activated before
it is “formed to be observed”. Third, Gih helps coordinate the
human and the environment. According to this discussion and as
elaborated by Lee et al. (2007) and Lee and Shaw (unpublished),
the concept of Gih is comparable with but more advanced than
the concept of affordance developed by ecological approaches
(see Jin and Lee, 2013; Jin et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2016, for further
suggestions).
FROM AFFORDANCE TO GIH
The concept of affordance is well known in ecological approaches
as a concept for explaining the coordination of perception and
action. A refinement of this concept or a substitution with
a new concept is nonetheless more productive for facilitating
further discussions in philosophy and biological processes.
According to Gibson (1979), affordance discloses a relationship
between a subject and an object, or the “psychical and
physical”, respectively. This concept is a higher-level concept.
To explain the concept at a more concrete level, the two
directions must be understood as subject-to-object and object-
to-subject. Later, ecological psychologists questioned whether
this concept adequately explains a subject’s inclinations or an
object’s properties. Whereas some scholars have criticized the
implications of the concept, other scholars have defended it
(for a review, see Michaels, 2003), contending that affordance
connotes the object’s property, directed as object-to-subject, and
the subject’s inclination, directed as subject-to-object. Therefore,
the subject’s “effectivity” or some ability of action has been
proposed (Michaels and Carello, 1981; Shaw et al., 1982). Other
academics have proposed “intentionality” for action (Shaw, 2001)
and “relation” (Chemero, 2003) to define an animal’s ability
to interact with aspects of the environment. Finally, some
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definitions that were extended to include “meaningfulness” were
proposed but criticized for being ambivalent in sensible testing
(Michaels, 2003).
Thus, it remains controversial whether the revisions of
affordance can free the concept from its original limitations.
First, the means by which potential effectivity can be activated
should be determined. Direction indicates what is implied with
a bi-direction relation, such as subject-to-object or object-to-
subject (e.g., Dotov et al., 2012). Second, how can potential
effectivity be activated in a situation? Is effectivity primed
by the mind, matter (or the body) or both? Third, it is
understood that affordance is coextensive with information. Is it
possible that affordance and information are not differentiated
in concept and reality (c.f., Fajen et al., 2009)? In proposing
a third paradigm, it is necessary to specify the entity that
subordinates both the mind and the material and thus affects
both the subject and the object. Therefore, this paper argues
that one such third entity, Gih, as discussed by Choi (1857)
and by Lee and Shaw (unpublished), is defined as potential
activation. The argument is threefold. First, Gih is specified, not
as static potential, but as activation without purpose. Second, Gih
specifies bi-directional interactions between subject and object.
Third, Gih is psychosomatic, thus relating the mind and the
body. These three propositions indicate that when refined, the
concept of Gih extends the understanding of the coordination of
perception and action beyond that proposed by the concept of
affordance.
Gih is demonstrated in the genealogy of the words used
in daily living as “blood-Gih” and “mind-Gih” (Lee and Shaw,
unpublished). Blood-Gih denotes passion and intention and
represents the activation from body (blood) to mind (emotion).
By contrast, mind-Gih corresponds to the health and physical
conditions as instances of activation from mind to body.
Therefore, blood-Gih and mind-Gih possess features that can
be characterized as activation and together represent a bi-
direction of Gih, mind-to-body and body-to-mind. The question
arises regarding how the blood or mind is compounded
with Gih to direct the other. Both the blood and the mind
are hypothesized to attain their relative properties. It is
through psychosomatics that the body (blood) works with the
mind. As the term psychosomatic implies, Gih attempts to
incorporate both the mental and biological processes in terms
of Eastern philosophy and Oriental medical science (Leslie and
Young, 1992; Tateno, 1993). Thus, Gih performs work that
is psychosomatic (see Lee and Shaw, unpublished, for further
discussion).
There is a critical reason to separate Gih from affordance.
As noted, Gih should be differentiated from Lih, which in
contrast implies a kind of reason that serves what is intended
(see Hwoang Lee and Daeseung Gi’s discussion in the above
chapter “Metaphysical Review”). As established by Gibson and
further developed by later ecological psychologists, affordance is
embedded with information, which thus implies directing the
effort of coordinating perception and action for a purpose. By
contrast, Gih is an activation potential and thus is not directed,
as it does not have purpose. Some philosophical perspectives
suggest concepts similar to Gih. For instance, “Elan vital” was
proposed as a “living force of no teleology” by Henri Louis
Bergson (1859–1941) (Papanicolaou and Gunter, 1987).
Consider a hypothetical example to illustrate the differences
between the understandings of perception and action that result
from applying the concepts of Gih and affordance. Suppose a
dog approaches a girl to bite her. The girl runs away from the
dog. Explained with the concepts of affordance and information,
the girl is informed that the dog is about to bite her, and she
is afforded with running away from the situation. However,
modeling the situation in terms of Gih, if the girl’s Gih is not
activated, then she cannot run away and thus cannot prevent
herself from being bitten by the dog. Hence, Gih activation is a
prerequisite to what follows with purpose, such as running away.
Gih is effectively neutral in purpose, though it can be activated.
Consider a more dramatic situation, such as a case in which the
girl’s Gih is highly activated. Suppose she encounters a high wall
while being chased by the dog. She will fight the dog. At this
moment, Gih is activated and is directed in terms of subject-to-
object for the girl and object-to-subject for the dog and the wall,
which also coordinates the mutual directions. Thus, the girl’s Gih
activation is situational because the wall blocks her retreat. Gih
is activated by and construed as a psychosomatic process such as
a fear of biting or the valor of combat, respectively manifested
as running or fighting. What is psychosomatic has the potential
to activate and influence both the mind and the body, and its
function is mediated by the hormonal metabolic and automatic
nervous systems.
GIH AS PSYCHOSOMATIC OPEN TO
EASTERN DISCIPLINES
Sword matching, the example mentioned in the Introduction,
offers a better example than the previous example of the girl and
the dog for comprehending Gih as a psychosomatic process. An
artist (A) performs a more advanced technique, such as a counter-
attack, on his or her opponent (B)’s body part (for example, B’s
wrist), just after (B) starts to attack (A) (for example, A’s head).
When (B) attacks (A)’s head, (B) must open his wrist, which is
performed at a sufficiently slow pace for (A) to counter-attack,
despite the wrist being a small part moving quickly. How can
this counter-attack be explained? Lee et al. (2012) suggested that
(A) could enlarge the small space of (B)’s hidden body part, the
wrist, and lengthen the time of (B)’s wrist movement to succeed
in a counter-attack in a second. Therefore, the perceptual scale
of (A) was enhanced (see Jin and Lee, 2013, for generalized
empirical evidence). Referring to a cognitive explanation, (A) is
more skilled because of repeated practice. However, this model
can explain only A’s skills, which are not specified in time and
space but are evaluated based on average conditions. In terms of
the Gih model, (A) has Gih as the psychosomatic potential that
is attuned to the present situation of perception-action, which
is activated by spiritual intention and coordinated by physical
autonomic processes. Gih can be trained through martial arts
practice and conceptualized as a type of physical and spiritual
learning. However, in the above case of the weak girl who must
fight against the cruel dog when blocked by the high wall, the
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level of Gih activation increases without training. Thus, Gih can
be situationally activated for survival to release psychosomatic
processes between the mind and body, thereby accommodating
the person to the environment.
If Gih is understood in terms of the psychosomatic process, it
makes sense that meditation practices and treatments performed
in Oriental medical science are examples of the principle of
Gih. Meditation practice relies on certain correct postures
and a focused mind. For the technique to integrate the
mind and body, it is advised that respiration should be
controlled (e.g., Schure et al., 2008; Jung et al., 2010). Breathing
is normally processed involuntarily but can be controlled
voluntarily with training. The control of respiration activates
the mediation between physical conditions—such as blood
circulation, hormonal metabolism, and nerve activation—and
mental states—such as consciousness, cognition, and emotion.
Thus, respiratory control is a psychosomatic process. Oriental
medical science can also be theorized as a means of circulating
Gih. Practitioners diagnose patients by touching the blood waves
of the body (ordinary, wrists), checking the strength and rate of
respiration, observing the colors of the face, and noting other vital
signs. The techniques used to treat the psychosomatic variable
of Gih include techniques such as the treatment of natural
medicines, hot steam stimuli (moxibustion), and needle stimuli
(acupuncture). Positive results have been reported in scientific
studies, despite some controversies (see Unschuld, 1985; Leslie
and Young, 1992; Guan and Fan, 2002; Noble, 2009, for further
discussions).
What can the consideration of Gih as a psychosomatic variable
contribute to empirical analysis? With respect to experimental
procedures, Gih must be measured through its effects on
behaviors associated with the mind. The observable phenomena
can then be attributed to certain scales in perception and action,
which are described as the terminal measures. For the measures
of perception and action, studies have analyzed the influences
of only some physical variables. In experimental analyses, Lee
et al. (2012) manipulated the conditions of an archer’s arm
control. The treatment in the study conducted by Jin and Lee
(2013) varied according to soccer players’ running speeds. In
the previous example of the artist sword matching, treatment
can similarly be varied based on patterns of footwork. Physical
manipulation has been understood to be empirical. Despite the
convenience of manipulation; however, such physical variables
are insufficient because they do not account for mental events.
Therefore, the intermediated variable must be manipulated at
the psychosomatic level, which links physical states and mental
processes.
For a psychosomatic design, respiration control can be
proposed in the sword matching example. Martial artists are
adept at catching attack points while the space or time to
attack is enlarged or prolonged. These phenomena occur by
way of the psychosomatic process of Gih enhancement, which is
activated by respiration control. In terms of paradigms, Gih as a
psychosomatic model can be construed as a “hologram” model,
such as that proposed by Pribram (1991), who argues that classic
paradigms have overly relied on analytic dispositions. Because
Gih, which is manipulated by respiration and other available
processes, is a psychosomatic variable, it must be reevaluated
as holographic rather than analytic. Thus, the discussion of Gih
can be extended to arrange the empirical variables in a hierarchy
ranging from the physical variables through the psychosomatic
variables to the mental variables.
Because the psychosomatic variable of Gih is institutionalized,
what is disposed of in popular discussions of psychological
questions should be elaborated and further clarified. Problems
concerning communication in language, aesthetic evaluation,
and social relations represent some instances of mediation
between mind and matter, or subject and object. If what has
been discussed in this paper regarding blood-Gih and mind-Gih
is extended, the terms of speaker-Gih and listener-Gih, artist-
Gih and appreciator-Gih, and social-Gih between the subject
and object could be tentatively proposed, provoking further
discussion.
CONCLUSION
The concept of Gih is compatible with Gibson’s concept of
affordance in some respects. In other respects, though, the two
concepts differ. Gih is a potential activation that possesses not
only physical properties but also a mental disposition, influencing
both subject and object, and thus should be considered a third
entity.
Along with the subsets “mind-Gih” and “body-Gih” (also
called “blood-Gih”), the concept of Gih accounts for the
bi-directional interactions between mind and body. Thus, the
concept advances the understanding of the coordination of
perception and action beyond that enabled by the concept of
affordance as initially proposed (Dotov et al., 2012) and conforms
to revised notions of intentionality and effectivity (Michaels and
Carello, 1981). The role of information in enacting affordances
implies that the latter is teleological. By contrast, Gih refers to
the potential to activate mental and physical states and thus
lacks purpose. Gih activation between the mind and body can be
refined with training through meditation or respiration, which
are known to control psychosomatic processes, thus influencing
an involuntary mechanism through voluntary control. The
possibility of such refinement remains a topic for discussion in
Eastern philosophy and Oriental medical science.
Gih can be considered a psychosomatic variable that is
located at the mid-level in a hierarchy of variables ranging
from physical to mental and thus should be distinguished
from affordance. Hence, Gih also passes the philosophical
test of Occam’s razor, which demands no redundancy when
scientific terms are created. Therefore, the refined term of
Gih is not synonymous with affordance. Nevertheless, further
discussion is required to discern whether the Gih concept could
incorporate elements of physical psychology (Turvey and Carello,
2012), which would mark a theoretical advancement from
the ecological approaches. Looking forward, the Gih concept
accommodates communication processes, aesthetic feelings, and
social relationships and may offer a way to integrate Eastern and
Western traditions of thought concerning the coordination of
perception and action.
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